At this writing America is in the middle of a dramatic economic downturn and many issues need addressed.

What is not mentioned is the part military adventure plays when combined with fiscal irresponsibility. The $10 billion a month spent in Iraq combined with what we have spent in Afghanistan would probably pay for the present bailout needed.

Was George Washington right with advice for our nation to not get involved in foreign entanglements?

In answer to that some have pointed out we are living in a smaller world and being a superpower we have to be involved. I would agree with that when it comes to commerce, but to military presence, maybe not.

Our supported adventure into Afghanistan will only prove successful when the Afghans are economically and militarily self-supporting and freely choose, after we leave, a capitalist-based economy and democratic government. Is that a long shot? Possibly, because democracy is best chosen not imposed.

Assuming Iraq turns out good should Iran be the next target?

Considering the demographics (a preponderant majority of Iranians are in their 20s) combined with the flow of information which pours into their country and the individual instinct to be free, Iran may, on its own, moderate and in some form, at some point, democratize.

The point is America cannot materially be everywhere at once.

Historically, it seems the pattern is when superpowers do not recognize supportable boundaries this leads to involuntary contraction because overextension itself is economically and materially unsustainable.

Examples would be Napoleon's incursion into Russia; Hitler's failure trying the same; Alexander's foray into India, the revenge of Persia against Greece for the burning of Sardis, which only solidified Greece's resolve and later gains.

Another early example where overextension may have caused a later weakening might be the Romans incursion into Gaul and Britain. (Tom Holland, Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic, 265-273.)

When Caesar, without authorization, made his bridge and crossed the Rhine in a preemptive strike, did that cross a boundary of sovereignty understood by Romans and Gauls alike? Though Caesar won the war did he start a long term simmering conflict which served as later justification for incursions for which the Romans might have been better prepared if they had instead solidified a prior position?

That the occupation of Gaul and Britain were indicative of overextension is reflected in the fact they were the first territories lost, along with Spain, because of later Germanic invasion. (Bryan Ward-Perkins, The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization, 40-43.)

Interestingly the eastern portion of the Roman world continued to thrive for the reasons the west fell: it recognized supportable boundaries and worked cooperatively with its potential enemy, Persia. (Ward-Perkins, 58-62.)

Every empire contracts, the question is, can a contraction be managed or does it always have to happen destructively and involuntarily?

Could America do something different and extend her influence without trying to be everywhere at once?

With an established and recognized border, with water on both sides and cooperative neighbors to the north and south; with no claim to territorial gain; with the idea of sharing liberty for all and promoting economic prosperity without occupation, she is, as superpowers go, in a unique historical position to extend her influence. But incursions into other nations are surely counterproductive.

Expecting others to be exactly like us and not cooperating with others or forcing the point when they're not could hurt us when we do need allies against an enemy who demands conversion at gun point.

The threat of the Cold War was replaced by radical Islamic interpretation. But what is the next threat? What dangers lie beyond the horizon for which we might best be prepared if we find and strengthen sustainable limits?

Patrick Scott Smith is a Springfield business owner and writer from Republic.